The reservoir of resentment that the Trump movement has tapped into is closely correlated with the contempt in which the leadership of the Democratic Party holds working-class people. In the former heartlands along the Rust Belt and in the south, Clinton and her clique on the Democratic National Committee are viewed as arrogant, snobbish, uncaring about 'ordinary people' and mostly serving the interests of their friends at Google and Goldman.
There was a palpable sense that the Clinton campaign did not care about the party's traditional base it took for granted. Her ideology betrayed the very people it purported to represent. Clinton's liberalism of the 'professional class' is empty, and this void is now occupied by Trump's insurgency.
The seeds were sown in the late 1960s when the Democrats first embraced a progressive politics defined essentially by social liberalism and they abandoned the idea of creating an industrial democracy by fighting cartel capitalism. Fast forward to the early 1990s when Bill Clinton's 'new center' aligned the party with liberal market globalization in which transnational ties progressively replace national bonds. Robert Reich, Clinton's Secretary of Labor, described this new model of political economy in the following terms: "There will be no national products or technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. There will no longer be national economies. At least as we have come to understand that concept". 1 Thus the Clintons' version of progressive politics rests on the idea of a capitalist culture that Compared with the emphasis on self-organization and mutual solidarity in the case of the civil rights movement, the Democrats' embrace of diversity and emancipation has promoted an identity politics that is no less divisive than Trump's atavistic nativism because it is a 'coalition of the fringes' that excludes the white working-class and sections of the middle class who resent identity politics for everyone else but them. Neither the Democrats nor the
Republicans have a positive conception of place and belonging around which new coalitions can emerge that overcome the old identity politics of the 'culture wars.'
Trump's victory is only in part the result of a 'white-lash' against the establishment obsession with certain minority rights and diversity at the expense of the majority. The other elements is the Latino, African-American, and even female vote that cannot be explained away by media bias or lack of education. What these different groups are most of all bitter about is liberal indifference or even hostility to a sense of belonging and the enduring importance of family, community, and locality. Trump drew support not simply from moral cave-dwellers (the xenophobes, racists and sexists who are much emboldened by his election) but much more significantly from working-and middle-class people who feel forgotten and resent their exclusion from Washington politics.
What this reveals is not merely the deep divisions between the Democrats and their former supporters but the growing gulf between the people and the U.S. establishment, which Trump has used to his double advantage -first smashing the Republican Party leadership before winning an election that was Clinton's to lose. Yet for all his posturing, Trump is a silverspoon demagogue who rails against the 'rigged system' he has profited from and the 'out-oftouch elite' of which he is a member. 4 A self-made Manhattan billionaire with alleged links to organized crime, Trump is neither a Middle American nor a Republican nor a classical conservative. Rather, his political outlook seems to combine nationalist-libertarian ideas with a preference for populist-authoritarian leadership at home and abroad. The red thread that runs through his rhetoric over the past thirty years is an anti-liberal assault on the implicit bipartisan consensus at the heart of U.S. politics: free trade, immigration and a liberal world order underwritten by America's economic and military might, as I have argued in these pages. Far from being another 'reset' in relations with Russia (which under Obama failed due to a lack of strategic vision based on shared interests), Trump seems to propose a fundamental rapprochement.
7 While many politicians and pundits will dismiss it as an alliance of reactionaries (à la Lindbergh and Hitler) or a new Populist International that also includes Britain's UKIP and France's Martine Le Pen, the aim is seemingly to get America's allies in Asia and Europe to pay their fair share for the U.S. security umbrella and to tone down the level of vitriol in order to avert an escalation with Moscow that might end in war.
For all his bluster and apparent incompetence, Trump may be a ruthless strategist with diabolic cunning and a wily plot that could yet outflank Russia's KGB-dominated leadership:
keeping the Kremlin guessing in a geopolitical chess contest in which a simpleton from 7 Here I am indebted to Russell Berman for comments on an earlier draft.
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Queens beats the 'supreme godfather' at his own game of trying to end the U.S.-led international order while oozing strength and 'making America great again.'
The paradox is that the Republicans control both Congress and the White House at a time when they are more deeply split than since the time of Lindbergh. Trump's insurgency has overthrown the hegemony of both Republican realists and the neocons, but the party establishment that is so profoundly steeped in American supremacy and a U.S.-dominated international order may yet strike back and try to torpedo Trump's renewal of old mercantilist, protectionist and isolationist tendencies, which have been dormant for long. Not to mention the entire American foreign, security and defence policy establishment, the federal bureaucracy and the deep state that will try to capture Trump or at least neutralize any adventurism in the global arena of agon.
So although we will not know for some time what Trump might do as President, his victory will likely mark the demise of the post-1945 liberal order that has been in retreat since 9/11 and the 2008 financial crash. What might replace it and what happens next is anyone's guess.
Will it be more global anarchy and a slide into direct confrontation between the U.S.A. and China? Or else some new order based on non-liberal institutions and rules, perhaps akin to a nineteenth-century type 'great power' concert in a new guise with an implicit recognition of spheres of influence? Either way, the tectonic plates have already shifted and the unfolding earthquake is only just beginning to engulf the West and the rest.
